Job Creation, Worker Churning, and Wages at Young Businesses by Erika McEntarfer et al.
BUSINESS DYNAMICS STATISTICS BRIEFING:
Job Creation, Worker Churning, and Wages 
at Young Businesses
November 2012Seventh in a series of reports using data from the  
U.S. Census Bureau’s Business Dynamics Statistics
John Haltiwanger 
University of Maryland
Henry Hyatt 
U.S. Bureau of the Census
Erika McEntarfer 
U.S. Bureau of the Census
Liliana Sousa 
U.S. Bureau of the Census
Business Dynamics Statistics Briefing:  
Job Creation, Worker Churning, and Wages at Young Businesses
About the Business Dynamics Statistics
      The Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) is a product of the U.S. Census Bureau that measures business 
openings and closings, startups, job creation, and job destruction by firm size, age, industrial sector, and 
state. The U.S. economy is comprised of more than six million establishments with paid employees. The 
population of these businesses is constantly churning—some businesses grow, others decline, and yet 
others close. New businesses constantly replenish this pool. The BDS monitors this activity to provide a 
picture of the dynamics underlying aggregate net employment growth. More information about the BDS can 
be found at http://www.census.gov/ces/dataproducts/bds/index.html.
©2012 by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. All rights reserved.
About the Quarterly Workforce Indicators
      The Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) are a product of the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal 
Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) program.1 The QWI are generated from federal and state 
administrative data on employers and employees combined with core Census Bureau censuses and surveys 
to produce a rich, quarterly dataset that tracks employment, hires, separations, job creation and destruction, 
and wages for stable employees and new hires. The most recent enhancement to the QWI has been the 
introduction of firm age and size,2 allowing, for the first time, a detailed look at the jobs, worker earnings, 
and employment turnover generated by firms of varying ages and sizes, and how these differ regionally 
and between demographic groups. The new tabulations by firm size and firm age are available at the state 
by four-digit NAICS and at the county by NAICS sector levels, with data extending back as far as 1990 for 
some states.3 In addition, in the near future the tabulations will include breakdowns by the gender, age, 
race, ethnicity, and education of the workforce. 
1. The LEHD program, part of the Center for Economic Studies, was partially supported by the following National Science Foundation Grants: SES-9978093, SES-0339191, and ITR-
0427889; National Institute on Aging Grant AG018854; and grants from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. More information about the LEHD program can be found at http://lehd.did.
census.gov.
2. The firm age and firm size data are sourced primarily from microdata used in the construction of the U.S. Census Bureau’s Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS, http:/www.census.
gov/ces/dataproducts/bds/index.html), a data product produced by the Center for Economic Studies, with the partial support of the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. 
3. These tabulations are readily available online: http://lehd.did.census.gov/led/datatools/qwiapp.html.
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4. Throughout this report, we use the terms “young” or “new firms” to refer to firms that are younger than two years old and “small firms” to refer to those with nineteen or 
fewer employees. 
5. Firm size is based on the total employment in all establishments belonging to the firm on March 12 of the previous year (or the current year for new firms). For any given 
consecutive two-year period, size is defined as the employment-weighted sum of firm size on March 12 in year t-1 of all establishments that are part of an EIN on March 12 in 
year t. This definition automatically covers mergers, divestitures, acquisitions, etc. For instance, if a firm in year t has three establishments belonging to three different firms in 
year t-1, initial firm size in year t is the weighted sum (where the weights are based on the year t size of each establishment) of the firm sizes in year t-1 of each of these three 
establishments. Firm age is based on the age of the oldest establishment in the year of the firm’s birth, and ages naturally over its lifetime. This definition addresses issues of 
ownership changes. For example, a new legal entity (i.e., firm) that results from some M&A activity is not necessarily considered a young firm; instead, it is assigned the age of its 
oldest establishment at the time of its birth. 
6. It is important to emphasize that the new tabulations permit detailed analysis at state, county, and industry level of detail. We focus on aggregated statistics in this brief as a way 
to help introduce the measures and the findings possible from these new measures.
7. See, Burgess, Lane, and Stevens (2000).
8. For a model and evidence about the importance of worker churning for improving allocative efficiency, see; e.g., Jovanovic and Moffitt (1990).
9. For evidence about the importance of job switching for wage growth, see, e.g., Topel and Ward (1992). 
Introduction
Prior research has established the important role 
of startups and fast-growing young businesses in job 
creation and employment growth in the U.S. economy 
(Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda, (2010)). New firms 
and young businesses account for about 70 percent of 
gross job creation and disproportionately contribute to 
net job creation.4 The experimentation and dynamism 
of startups and young businesses also contribute to 
productivity growth (see, e.g., Haltiwanger (2012)). 
While the contribution to job creation and productivity 
is increasingly well understood, relatively little is known 
about the characteristics of the jobs generated by 
startups and young businesses. We use newly released 
data from the QWI using the firm size and firm age 
measures developed from the Business Dynamics 
Statistics (BDS) to shed light on characteristics of 
jobs at young businesses.5 We focus on three key 
characteristics of jobs—job creation, the churning of 
workers, and earnings per worker.6 
Job creation and earnings are well-understood 
concepts. By worker churning,7 we refer to the hiring 
in excess of job creation and the separations in excess 
of job destruction that are a ubiquitous feature of 
the U.S. labor market. The high pace of worker 
churning in the United States plays a critical role in 
improving the allocation of workers to jobs—that is, 
improving the quality of matches between workers 
and jobs.8 Moreover, churning (i.e., switching jobs) is 
very important for wage growth over the life cycle of 
workers.9 In this paper, we explore how wages and 
churning at startups and young businesses differ from 
those of more mature businesses. We also explore 
changes in these job characteristics over time. We 
consider these patterns in light of the differences in 
gross and net job creation across firms by firm size and 
firm age. 
We find that young firms, defined as employers 
in the first two years of their lives, have higher job 
creation and job destruction rates than older firms. A 
substantial fraction of the job creation for young firms 
is due to the job creation that occurs in the quarter of 
starting up. However, there is substantial subsequent 
job creation as well as job destruction in the 
succeeding quarters in the first two years. The overall 
net job creation (the difference between job creation 
and destruction) is much higher for young firms than 
for older firms.
Beyond the job creation and destruction patterns, 
young firms exhibit significantly higher worker 
churning than older firms do. Hiring and separation 
rates at young firms are extremely high. Despite very 
high churning rates, however, job creation accounts 
for a much higher fraction of hires at young firms 
than at more mature firms. We also find evidence of a 
stronger recovery in hiring and job creation in young 
firms after 2008, relative to established firms. In fact, 
it is only for young firms that we find a recovery in 
the pace of churning after the Great Recession. Still, 
we find a declining overall trend in the churning of 
workers across jobs in our 1998–2010 time series.
Turning to earnings per worker, we document 
some striking trends since the early 2000s. We find 
evidence that the wage gap between established firms 
and startups has increased significantly in the last 
decade, largely due to declines in earnings per worker 
associated with startup firms. Some of this decline is 
accounted for by changes in the industry composition 
of startups over the last decade, but, even after 
controlling for these changes, all real earnings growth 
in the last decade has occurred at established firms. 
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To explore these issues, we first quantify the 
patterns of job creation and destruction by firm age 
in the QWI. Patterns of job creation and destruction 
by firm size and firm age have been the focus of 
much recent research (e.g., Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and 
Miranda (2010)), but such statistics using the QWI are 
new. Exploring these first provides a basis for putting 
our novel findings on worker churning and wages into 
perspective. 
Job Creation and Destruction by 
Firm Age: A View from the QWI
The newly released statistics from the QWI 
include quarterly establishment-level job creation and 
destruction by firm size and firm age using the firm 
age and size concepts and measures derived from the 
BDS.10 Job creation measures the employment gains 
from the expansion of existing establishments and 
the creation of new establishments. Job destruction 
measures the employment losses from contracting and 
closing establishments. In the QWI, these measures 
reflect the changes at the establishment level over 
the course of a quarter.11 The newly released QWI 
statistics provide such measures classified by the age 
and size of the parent firm. For additional details of 
how the data are constructed, see Haltiwanger et al. 
(2012).
Figure 1 shows the rates12 of job creation and 
destruction by broad firm age groups from 1998:2 to 
2011:1 for a selection of twenty-eight states.13 These 
twenty-eight states account for 56 percent of total 
U.S. nonfarm employment in the second quarter of 
1998, according to the BLS’s Current Employment 
Statistics. Fluctuating around 20 percent, job creation 
rates for the youngest businesses—those that are 
zero to one year old—are much higher than for 
more mature businesses.14 Job creation rates for the 
youngest firms are twice those in the firm age range 
of two to ten years and four times as large as the rates 
for mature businesses (eleven-plus years old). Though 
less dramatic than the differences in job creation rates, 
job destruction rates also are higher for the youngest 
businesses than for more mature businesses. 
In comparing the job creation and destruction 
rates across firm age groups illustrated in Figure 1,  
it is evident that young firms have the largest net job 
creation rate (the difference between job creation 
and destruction). For the youngest firms, the net 
job creation rate in booms exceeds 10 percent and, 
even in the recent recession, exceeded 6 percent. In 
10. In interpreting the findings in this paper, it is important to note that the job creation, job destruction, hires, and separation measures are at the establishment level, whereas firm 
size and firm age categories are based on the characteristics of the parent firm. This implies, for example, that even if the establishment is young and small, it will be classified into 
the large firm size class and mature firm age class if it belongs to a large, mature firm.
11. See Abowd et. al. (2009) for a detailed description of the QWI, including job creation and destruction measures. The quarterly rates of job creation and destruction in the QWI 
are quite similar to those found in the Business Employment Dynamics (BED). The patterns by firm size and firm age are not directly comparable to seemingly similar classifications 
in the BED because the concept of the firm is narrower in the BED than in the QWI and BDS. In the QWI and the BDS, a firm is based on the concept of operational control: entities 
under the operational control of a national enterprise are associated with the same firm. In the BED, the firm size concept is based on activity operating under common taxpayer 
(EIN) identification numbers. It is not uncommon for large firms to have many EINs.
12. These rates are constructed as follows: the numerator is job creation or job destruction, the net employment change between the beginning and end of a quarter at employers 
with expanding and contracting employment, respectively. The denominator is the average of employment at the beginning and end of the quarter. For technical definitions of 
beginning- and end-of-quarter employment, see Abowd et al. (2009).
13. All figures in this report are based on the QWI, a publicly available data product produced by LEHD. All values have been seasonally adjusted. All figures are based on the 
universe of UI-covered, private-sector jobs from 1998:2 to 2011:1 for a sample of twenty-eight states chosen from the Local Employment Dynamics federal-state partnership. Note 
that the QWI has statistics for almost all states in recent years, but to generate a consistent time series to 1998, we limit analysis to twenty-eight states (some state time series 
extend to as early as 1990). For our purposes, we chose to include quarters in the late 1990s to capture the robust period of job growth prior to the 2001 recession. The included 
states are Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. These figures do not include public-
sector employment or self-employment. As a robustness check, we have replicated the analysis in this paper for the 2005:4 period using data for all states except for California, 
Virginia, Massachusetts, and Louisiana, and Washington, D.C. All of the latter states are undergoing some further data infrastructure developments on the QWI so that the firm size 
and firm age tabulations are not yet available for these states. We note that the results we obtain from the larger sample of states are virtually identical to those we report here, 
which makes us confident that our results are representative.
14. Supplemental estimation (not shown) shows that about half of the job creation of the zero to one age category is due to establishment births. Note that in the QWI and BDS, 
since a new firm is not simply a new establishment but a new firm where all of the establishments of the new firm also are new, establishment births also contribute some job 
creation in older firm age groups. There is some advantage of quantifying the gross and net job creation over the first two years rather than simply at the quarter of birth. In the first 
quarter of activity, new establishments/firms can only contribute to job creation. But an increasingly well-understood pattern is that young firms exhibit an up-or-out dynamic. Taking 
such dynamics into account, the net job creation rates over two years provide some perspective of the net employment gains. That is, the net job creation rate for establishments 
belonging to firms zero to one years old will reflect the combined contribution of the job creation from entry, job creation from post-entry growth of establishments of young firms, 
and job destruction from establishment contractions over this period. Note that there is no mechanical implication that the net job creation from young firms must be positive, even 
though it includes the contribution of job creation from entry, which can only be positive. It could be that entry is dominated by short-lived firms that enter and almost immediately 
exit (within the zero to one age category). In that specific example, net job creation from young firms would be zero. 
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contrast, the net job creation rates for more mature 
businesses are positive in booms and negative 
in recessions, with a slightly higher average for 
businesses between two to ten years old than for 
those eleven years old or older. The finding that the 
highest net job creation rates are from young firms is 
consistent with the evidence in Haltiwanger, Jarmin, 
and Miranda (2010) from the BDS.
Job creation rates are procyclical, that is, they 
rise during economic expansions for all firm age 
groups, while job destruction rates are countercyclical. 
Though these patterns are not surprising, the cyclical 
patterns differ sharply across the 2001 and 2007/09 
recessions. While there was a notable increase in the 
job destruction rate for young businesses in the 2001 
recession, the job creation rate for these businesses 
did not change much. In contrast, the 2007/09 
recession exhibited a more pronounced decline in 
job creation for the youngest businesses, along with 
an accompanying increase in job destruction. The 
implication is that the 2007/09 recession hit the 
youngest businesses much harder than the 2001 
recession did. Though the youngest businesses were 
hit hard in the 2007/09 recession, they are the group 
that has had the most robust recovery, with their job 
creation rate growing from 0.18 to 0.23 between 
2009 and 2011.15 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of employment 
and job creation by firm age. Though most jobs are at 
the most mature firms, young firms disproportionately 
create jobs. The youngest firms (ages zero to one) 
account for about 15 percent of overall job creation 
while firms between two and ten years old account 
for about 25 percent of job creation. So, combined, 
15. The Business Dynamics Statistics also shows an increase in net and gross job creation for young firms from March 2009 to March 2010 (for example, see Haltiwanger, Jarmin, 
and Miranda (2012)). Overall job creation rates also rise in the BDS from March 2009 to March 2010, although net employment growth in 2010 is still negative. In the BDS, net 
employment growth is less negative than in 2009, but, although job creation rises some and job destruction falls substantially, the BDS shows a net decline from March 2009 to 
March 2010. In comparing the statistics from the QWI to the BDS, appropriate caution is called for, given differences in frequency (QWI is quarterly and BDS is annual from March to 
March) and scope. Still, the overall patterns are similar. We also note that the BDS shows a declining share of employment of young firms, consistent with what we find in Figure 3.
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Figure 1
Quarterly Job Creation and Destruction by Firm Age   
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2–10 years (Job Creation) 2–10 years (Job Destruction) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on seasonally adjusted QWI tabulations for twenty-eight states. 
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these two groups account for about 40 percent of 
job creation—much higher than their combined 
employment share of 25 percent. 
The share of young firms has been declining over 
our sample, as observed in Figure 3. The decline in 
the share of young businesses exhibited in the QWI 
is consistent with the declines identified in the BDS 
and reflects the declining pace of business startups 
(see, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2011, 2012), 
Stangler and Kedrosky (2010), and Litan and Reedy 
(2011)).16 Given that job creation and destruction 
rates are higher for younger businesses on average, 
a declining share of young businesses helps account 
for the overall decline in job creation and destruction 
in the QWI. For example, the average quarterly job 
creation rate for our sample of twenty-eight states 
in the cyclical peak in 1999 is more than 15 percent 
higher than in the cyclical peak of 2006.17
Despite High Turnover at Young 
Firms, Job Creation is a Larger 
Share of Hiring at Young Employers 
Relative to Established Firms
While Figure 1 confirms the findings of earlier studies 
that the youngest firms have the highest net job 
creation rates, the newly released QWI with firm 
0–1 Years 2–10 Years 11+ Years
Figure 2
Shares of Employment and Job Creation by Firm Age, 
1998–2011 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on seasonally adjusted QWI tabulations for twenty-eight states. 
0 
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0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
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16. Figure 3 reflects the overall share of employment of young firms, defined as firms less than two years old. Many factors may underlie this pattern—a decline in the startup 
rate, a decline in the job creation rate for young firms, and/or an increase in the job destruction rate for young firms. Figure 2 does not show changing trends for job creation 
and destruction rates, and evidence from the BDS suggests the patterns in Figure 3 are due to declining cohort size of entrants. In comparing Figures 2 and 3, it is important to 
distinguish between the net and gross rates for the cohort of young firms in any given year (Figure 2) with the possible changing size of each entering cohort, which will inherently 
influence Figure 3. Note that in any year in which the cohort size of entry changes, we will observe a change in the net and gross job creation rate of young firms. However, if this 
reflects a change in the trend of cohort sizes, then in the steady state the share will continue to change while the net growth rate of each cohort will converge in the steady state to 
a constant. The reason is that Figure 2 reflects the growth rates for specific cohorts, while Figure 3 captures changing size of cohorts over time. 
17. This is consistent with evidence from the BDS and BED, which also show a declining trend in job creation and destruction (see, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2011) and 
Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2012)).
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size and firm age show that these firms also exhibit 
higher worker turnover. We start by examining 
patterns of hires and separation rates by firm age. 
Hires and separation rates reflect the flow of workers 
into and out of establishments in a given quarter. 
Figure 4 shows that both hires and separation rates, 
the proportion of the workforce in each quarter that 
either is hired or leaves employment in each firm age 
category in that same quarter, are highest for young 
firms and fall as firms age.
Between 1998 and 2011, the average quarterly 
hiring rate for young firms (zero to one years old) 
moved between a high of almost 38 percent in the 
late 1990s to a low of less than 32 percent in 2009. 
In other words, during most of the past decade, 
more than a third of all workers in young firms had 
been hired in the current quarter. For older firms, the 
quarterly hires rates were significantly lower, declining 
from 28 percent to 18 percent for firms in the two- 
to ten-year age range, and 19 percent to 11 percent 
for mature firms. Figure 4 also illustrates that young 
firms have higher separation rates than older firms do. 
Between 1998 and 2011, between 25 percent and 
30 percent of all workers in young firms left those 
firms in each quarter. Also revealed in Figure 4 is that, 
while all firm age groups exhibited decreases in hires 
and separations during the Great Recession, only the 
youngest showed significant signs of recovery by the 
first quarter of 2011. 
Worker churning, the movement of workers 
between jobs not associated with job creation or 
destruction, is a substantial fraction of overall hires 
and separations.18 One way to gauge the relative 
importance of worker churning is to examine the  
ratio of job creation to hires and the ratio of job 
destruction to separations. Figure 5 graphs these  
ratios by firm age. 
18. Some caution is required in comparing the job creation and destruction rates in Figure 1 and the hires and separations rates in Figure 4. Job creation and destruction rates reflect 
net changes in employment at the establishment level from the beginning to the end of the quarter. Hires and separation rates reflect the cumulative flow of hires and separations 
over the quarter. A worker who is hired and separates within the same quarter will contribute to the hires and separations measures but not to job creation or destruction. 
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Figure 3
Share of Employment at the Youngest Firms
Source: Authors’ calculations based on seasonally adjusted QWI tabulations for twenty-eight states. 
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Figure 4
Hires and Separations as a Share of Employment in 
Young vs. Established Firms
0–1 years (Hires) 0–1 years (Separations) 
2–10 years (Hires) 2–10 years (Separations) 
11+ years (Hires) 11+ years (Separations) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on seasonally adjusted QWI tabulations for twenty-eight states. 
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With an average job-creation-to-hires ratio of 
0.40, young firms have the highest share of hires 
accounted for by job creation, as shown in Figure 5. In 
other words, four out of every ten hires at young firms 
are for newly created jobs. This ratio is much higher 
than in older firms, where the ratio fluctuates between 
0.25 and 0.33. Interestingly, the job-destruction-to-
separation ratio for younger firms is no higher than for 
other firms, implying that the fraction of separations at 
the youngest firms due to worker churning is about as 
high as at more mature firms. Taken together, these 
two ratios show that, while a large fraction of the 
hires at the youngest firms is due to job creation, the 
share of separations due to job destruction at such 
firms is in line with older firms.
Figure 5 also shows a striking upward trend in the 
ratio of job creation to hires during the past decade, 
indicating a decline in worker churning for all firm 
ages.19 That is, employers of all ages are hiring fewer 
workers in excess of the number of jobs being created. 
Many factors may underlie these trends, but it may 
reflect an increasing hesitation of workers to leave 
current jobs for new employment. Because job change 
accounts for a substantial portion of earnings growth, 
especially for younger workers (Topel and Ward 
(1992)), this decrease in churning reflects a decrease in 
workers’ opportunities for earnings growth. 
Figure 5 not only shows that the share of 
separations due to job destruction is rising over the 
time period, but also that the cyclical patterns of 
this ratio vary substantially. The peaks of the job-
destruction-to-separations ratios coincide with the two 
recessions captured in this time series. During these 
peaks, workers were more than twice as likely to be 
19. Hires are referred to as H in the graphs, and separations are referred to as S in the graphs.
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leaving jobs due to job destruction as they had been 
in the late 1990s. During the Great Recession, by far 
the worse of the two recessions, between 30 percent 
and 35 percent of job separations were due to job 
destruction, implying a higher share of layoffs. 
The increase in the job-destruction-to-separations 
ratio is especially large for the oldest businesses in 
the Great Recession. The changing composition of 
separations in recessions reflects changes in the nature 
of the reallocation of workers and jobs in recessions. In 
good times, many separations are quits, with workers 
moving up the career ladder by switching employers. 
In contrast, during recessions, job destruction and 
layoffs increasingly dominate separations. Related 
research shows that workers who are laid off are more 
likely to experience an unemployment spell and suffer 
an earnings loss from separations.20 
Another way to characterize worker churning is in 
terms of the difference between hires and job creation 
and the difference between separations and job 
destruction as shares of employment. In considering 
these difference measures, observe that there is an 
identity such that Hires – Job Creation = Separations 
– Job Destruction.21 Figure 6 shows the resulting 
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Shares of Hires and Separations Due to Job Creation and 
Destruction in Young vs. Established Firms
0–1 years (JC/H) 0–1 years (JD/S) 
2–10 years (JC/H) 2–10 years (JD/S) 
11+ years (JC/H) 11+ years (JD/S) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on seasonally adjusted QWI tabulations for twenty-eight states. 
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20. See Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2012) and Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2010) for discussion of this related research. 
21. This identity follows from the identity that Net Employment Change = Hires – Separations = Job Creation – Destruction. This identity holds even given the fact that hires and 
separations represent flows over the entire quarter while job creation and destruction represent changes from the beginning to the end of the quarter. Seasonal adjustment is 
different for each of the series, which can break the identity. We also note that these identities don’t hold in the published QWI for highly disaggregated data, given the noise 
infusion used for disclosure avoidance in the QWI. Even at high levels of aggregation, noise infusion can yield very modest differences. In spite of these two factors, Figure 6 shows 
that these identities essentially hold in the published, seasonally adjusted series.
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Figure 6
Worker Churning Rates by Firm Age
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on seasonally adjusted QWI tabulations for twenty-eight states. Worker 
churning is measured in two ways: Hires-Jobs Creation (H-JC) and Separations-Job Destruction (S-JD). Note 
that these two measurements should yield identical worker churning, with some variation created by noise 
infusion used to protect the confidentiality of the data and by seasonal adjustment factors.
 H-JC (0–1 years) S-JD (0–1 years) 
 H-JC (2–10 years) S-JD (2–10 years) 
 H-JC (11+ years) S-JD (11+ years)
worker churning rates (as shares of employment) by 
firm age.22 It is apparent that worker churning as a 
percent of employment declines with firm age. This 
finding holds in spite of the high job-creation-to-hires 
ratio for young firms. The hiring rate is so high for 
young businesses relative to older businesses that 
the difference between hires and job creation (as a 
percent of employment) is larger for young businesses. 
Churning rates are procyclical. In the recessions 
of 2001 and 2007/09, the churning rates for firms of 
all ages dropped substantially. These patterns reflect 
workers and firms becoming more cautious about 
making new matches in recessions. In recessions, 
workers are less likely to quit, which in turn reduces 
the number of vacancies and, thus, hires. Figure 6 also 
shows a trend decline in worker churning rates for 
firms of all ages.23 This decline is over and above the 
decline in job reallocation (creation and destruction) 
that we observe for this same period. The implication 
is that, not only is there less reallocation of jobs across 
producers, but also less reallocation of workers across 
existing jobs in the last fifteen years. The decline in 
22. The employment measure we use for these rates is the number of job matches in the quarter (“m” in the QWI statistics). This measure of employment is most appropriate for 
the flow-based hires and separation statistics, which reflect changes in this number of matches. This employment measure is larger (by about 23 percent) than is the number of 
workers who have a match in both the prior and current quarters (the “b” measure in the QWI). The large ratio of m to b reflects many matches that have short durations. It is 
important to consider such matches in interpreting the hires and separation rates reported here as well as the comparison between the hires and separations to job creation and 
destruction. 
23. The decline in worker churning rates is consistent with the findings in Lazear and Spletzer (2012).
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churning accounts for nearly three-quarters of the 
decline in turnover that appears in Figure 4. Many 
factors may underlie this trend decline in churning. 
One factor might be the aging of the U.S. workforce, 
with young workers inherently engaged in more job 
switching than older workers are. The planned release 
of QWI by firm age with the workforce demographic 
characteristics will permit exploring this hypothesis.
The secular and cyclical declines in worker 
churning rates are greater for older businesses, but 
are apparent for all categories. In both the 2001 and 
(especially) 2007/09 recessions, worker churning rates 
decline, but fail to recover to their previous peak after 
the recession ends. After the 2001 recession, the gap 
between worker churning rates for the oldest and 
youngest businesses widened. In addition, worker 
churning rates for the youngest businesses exhibit 
a modest recovery after the 2007/09 recession, but 
remain low for the more mature businesses. In the 
first quarter of 2011, the churning rate for young 
businesses exhibits a slight reduction. Data for 
subsequent periods will be needed to understand 
this reduction, but, in one way, churning can be 
thought of as an indicator of the confidence of 
workers and firms to engage in job switching. From 
that perspective, this slight dip in 2011 may reflect an 
increase in caution (erosion of confidence) by workers 
and firms for young firms.
Earnings at Startups Peaked in the 
Early 2000s and Have Stagnated or 
Fallen Since
Real monthly earnings per worker are shown in 
Figure 7 by firm age and by firm size. For this purpose, 
we calculate earnings per worker only for workers 
who work full quarters.24 Since churning rates are 
higher at younger and smaller businesses, this implies 
that younger and smaller businesses have a larger 
fraction of workers in any given quarter who have only 
partial earnings for the quarter. Such differences in 
churning are interesting in their own right as discussed 
above, but, for this discussion on earnings, we want 
to abstract from such variation.25 In what follows, 
we often refer to earnings per worker as wages for 
shorthand. 
Figure 7 shows that workers at young and small 
firms have substantially lower earnings than workers at 
larger and more mature firms do. Figure 7 also shows 
that real earnings have been growing at the large and 
mature businesses while either falling or remaining 
stagnant at young and small businesses. Figure 8 helps 
highlight the changing relative patterns by showing 
the ratios of the real monthly earnings across firm 
age and firm size groups. The relative premium for 
being at a large and mature firm in terms of average 
monthly earnings per worker has risen substantially 
over this period. Just before the recession of 2001, 
workers at new firms earned about 85 percent as 
much as workers at mature firms (eleven-plus years 
old). By 2011, this earnings ratio had dropped to 
70 percent. The earnings premium associated with 
working in a large employer versus a smaller employer 
also grew during this time period: average real 
monthly earnings in small firms fell from a high of  
78 percent in 2001 to a low of 66 percent in 2011. 
An important reason for the change in earnings 
premiums associated with firm age and size is 
the changing industrial composition over the past 
decade. To the extent that small or young firms are 
associated with lower-wage industries, we would 
expect the wage premiums to change as the industry 
compositions change. To address this, Figure 8 also 
plots the average monthly earnings premiums, fixing 
industry composition at the level present in the second 
quarter of 1999. Though this greatly diminishes the 
decrease in earnings at young firms relative to old 
firms (implying, indeed, that startups later in the 
decade are more likely to be in lower-wage sectors), 
industry reweighting does not explain the drop in 
relative earnings in small firms. Small employers, it 
seems, have become increasingly unable to match the 
wages offered by large employers.26 Demographic 
tabulations slated for production in future QWI 
releases will allow us to take a closer look at this 
phenomenon. 
24. Earnings in the QWI are the UI-covered earnings of each employee reported by his or her employer in each quarter. Earnings have been adjusted for inflation.
25. The patterns for real monthly earnings for all workers are quite similar to those presented in Figure 7.
26. This explanation abstracts from potential differences in non-earned compensation and unmeasured benefits. Research in this area has documented lower benefits in startups and 
young firms (for example, Litwin and Phan, 2012).
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Figure 7
Real Monthly Earnings for (Full-Quarter) Workers 
at Young vs. Established Firms
2009 201120051999 2001 2003 2007
Source: Authors’ calculations based on seasonally adjusted QWI tabulations for twenty-eight states. 
Reported earnings have been adjusted for inflation to 2000Q1 values.
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Partly, these patterns reflect the well-known  
and well-documented employer-size wage premium—
that is, wages are higher at larger businesses.  
Young businesses are typically also small businesses  
(see Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2011)), so 
the firm age premium is closely linked to the firm 
size premium. Of course, many factors underlie the 
employer size wage premium itself (see, e.g., Brown 
and Medoff (1989)). Understanding all factors that 
underlie the employer size wage premium and the 
related employer age wage premium is beyond the 
scope of this short paper.27 Part of this may reflect 
differences in human capital accumulation. For 
example, by construction, it is not feasible to have 
developed much firm-specific capital at new firms. 
Moreover, it might be that the new and young firms 
offer the prospect of future wage growth if the firm 
is successful (e.g., offering stock options at startups 
in the information and other high-tech sectors is a 
common means of attracting and retaining highly 
talented workers in these sectors). Our initial analysis 
of the newly released QWI statistics by firm size and 
firm age do not immediately yield insights into these 
issues but they do show that there are distinct cross-
sectional and time series differences in wages by 
firm size and firm age that warrant further attention. 
Moreover, one striking pattern in Figure 8 is that the 
age premium is much smaller than the size premium. 
Investigating this difference is beyond the scope of this 
analysis, but should be an area for future research. 
27. Brown and Medoff (2003) explore the role of factors underlying the employer age premium. 
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Figure 8
The Employer Age and Size Premium Increases: Real Monthly Earnings 
(of Full-Quarter Employees) at Young and Small Firms as a Percentage 
of Real Monthly Earnings at Established and Large Firms28
2009 201120051999 2001 2003 2007
Source: Authors’ calculations based on seasonally adjusted QWI tabulations for twenty-eight states. 
Reported earnings have been adjusted for inflation to 2000Q1 values.
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Conclusion
It is well known that young businesses have 
higher net job creation rates and a higher pace of 
gross job creation and destruction. Using newly 
released statistics from the QWI by firm age and 
firm size, we show this well-known pattern holds in 
the QWI. But the QWI offer a unique perspective on 
additional features of the dynamics of workers and 
jobs by firm age and firm size. In this report we focus 
on two key features—worker churning and earnings 
dynamics.
We show that a much larger fraction of hiring 
at young firms is due to job creation relative to more 
mature firms. However, in spite of this high ratio, the 
difference between the hiring and job creation rates 
(what we call worker churning) declines with firm age. 
The high pace of churning at young firms is consistent 
with the view that young firms are undergoing a 
period of experimentation and trial and error. The 
new findings on worker churning show that this 
experimentation results in a high churning rate for 
young firms. 
Worker churning rates fell substantially in the 
2001 and 2007/09 recessions and also exhibit a related 
secular decline. The cyclical and secular declines in 
worker churning rates over the last fifteen years are 
over and above the previously documented decline in 
business dynamism as measured by job reallocation 
over the same period. Worker churning reflects the 
reallocation of workers across existing jobs, and the 
evidence here is that the pace of such churning has 
declined. Worker churning arguably contributes to 
improved match quality between workers and firms; 
hence, this decline potentially implies a decline in 
28. Industry weighing is based on the industry composition in the thirty-four states in this sample in the second quarter of 1999. This figure excludes three types of employers: public 
sector, auto manufacturers, and household appliance manufacturers.
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match quality in the United States. In a related fashion, 
it is an indicator that the U.S. labor market has become 
less flexible over time, at least in terms of the tendency 
to have workers move across firms.
The secular and cyclical declines in worker churning 
are connected, since, in both the 2001 and 2007/09 
recessions, worker churning declined substantially 
and then failed to recover to the previous peak. This 
downward pattern is more apparent for more mature 
firms; in that respect, young firms are more engaged 
in this form of flexibility. However, we also know that 
the share of startups and, therefore, young firms is 
declining over this same period (which we verify holds 
in the newly released QWI data). With fewer young 
firms, the overall decline in worker churning is even 
greater.
Another new perspective on these dynamics that 
the QWI permits is tracking earnings per worker. We 
find that workers at young firms have lower earnings 
per worker than at more mature firms. This is not 
surprising, since it is clearly related to the well-known 
finding that workers at larger firms have higher wages 
and young firms tend to be small. However, we also 
document that the firm age wage premium has been 
rising over time. Thus, adding to the trend decline in 
the pace of startups, we also observe that earnings for 
workers at such startups have declined in relative terms 
as well.
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